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This	  is	  a	  draft	  of	  an	  article	  whose	  final	  and	  definitive	  form	  will	  be	  published	  in	  the	  Australasian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  [2015].	  The	  Australasian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  is	  available	  online	  at:	  http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/	  	  	  
Good	  News	  for	  Moral	  Error	  Theorists:	  A	  Master	  Argument	  Against	  
Companions	  in	  Guilt	  Strategies	  	  	  Abstract:	  Moral	  error	  theories	  are	  often	  rejected	  by	  appeal	  to	  ‘companions	  in	  guilt’	  arguments.	  The	  most	  popular	  form	  of	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  takes	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  as	  a	  ‘companion’	  and	  proceeds	  by	  analogy.	  I	  show	  that	  this	  strategy	  fails.	  I	  claim	  that	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  theorist	  must	  understand	  epistemic	  reasons	  as	  evidential	  support	  relations	  if	  her	  argument	  is	  to	  be	  dialectically	  effective.	  I	  then	  present	  a	  dilemma.	  Either	  epistemic	  reasons	  are	  evidential	  support	  relations	  or	  they	  are	  not.	  If	  they	  are	  not	  then,	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  fails.	  If	  they	  are,	  then	  a	  reduction	  of	  epistemic	  reasons	  to	  evidential	  support	  relations	  becomes	  available	  and,	  consequently,	  epistemic	  reasons	  cease	  to	  be	  a	  viable	  ‘companion’	  for	  moral	  reasons.	  I	  recommend	  this	  structure	  of	  argument	  over	  existing	  strategies	  within	  the	  literature	  and	  defend	  my	  claims	  against	  recent	  objections	  from	  companions	  in	  guilt	  theorists.	  	  	  Keywords:	  Companions	  in	  guilt;	  moral	  error	  theory;	  epistemic	  reasons.	  	  
0.	  Introduction	  	  Moral	  error	  theorists	  believe	  that	  our	  moral	  judgments	  are	  systematically	  mistaken	  [Marks	  2013,	  Olson	  2013,	  Streumer	  2013].	  In	  this	  regard	  moral	  judgments	  are,	  they	  claim,	  on	  a	  par	  with	  judgments	  of	  other,	  systematically	  mistaken	  regions	  of	  discourse	  such	  as	  astrology	  or	  pseudo-­‐scientific	  theories	  [Joyce	  2001].	  If	  true,	  this	  is	  a	  striking	  result.	  Not	  only	  are	  moral	  convictions	  often	  strongly	  held	  but	  they	  are	  also	  of	  obvious	  practical	  importance.	  Yet	  this	  striking	  result	  follows	  from	  two	  intuitively	  plausible	  claims.	  	  	  The	  first	  claim	  concerns	  the	  presuppositions	  that	  we	  make	  as	  ordinary	  moral	  judgers.1	  An	  example	  illustrates	  the	  point.	  Suppose	  that	  I	  witness	  a	  stranger	  committing	  an	  act	  of	  gratuitous	  cruelty.	  I	  immediately	  judge	  that	  he	  morally	  ought	  not	  to	  act	  in	  this	  way.	  In	  making	  this	  judgment	  I	  presumably	  take	  it	  that	  there	  is	  some	  reason	  that	  he	  ought	  not	  to	  act	  in	  this	  way	  -­‐	  perhaps	  his	  action	  causes	  avoidable	  suffering,	  or	  demeans	  the	  victim.	  And	  insofar	  as	  my	  judgment	  is	  
moral,	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  stranger	  not	  to	  act	  in	  this	  way	  even	  if	  he	  wishes	  to	  do	  so,	  or	  if	  some	  social	  convention	  happens	  to	  permit	  it.	  In	  doing	  this	  I	  presuppose	  the	  existence	  of	  what	  are	  typically	  referred	  to	  as	  categorical	  reasons	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Concerns	  with	  categoricity	  aren’t	  the	  only	  basis	  for	  a	  moral	  error	  theory.	  But	  they	  are	  the	  only	  basis	  with	  which	  I	  will	  be	  concerned	  here.	  
	   2	  
for	  action:	  reasons	  for	  action	  that	  don’t	  just	  obtain	  in	  virtue	  of	  one’s	  contingently	  held	  desires	  or	  of	  mere	  social	  convention.2	  The	  existence	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  reason	  is	  generally	  thought	  to	  be	  presupposed	  by	  ordinary	  moral	  judgers	  when	  making	  moral	  judgments.3	  Call	  this	  the	  conceptual	  premise.	  The	  second	  premise	  of	  the	  error-­‐theoretic	  argument	  is	  that	  there	  are	  no	  categorical	  reasons	  for	  action.	  This	  premise	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  reasons	  for	  action	  exist	  only	  where	  there	  is	  some	  desire	  or	  social	  convention	  to	  explain	  their	  existence	  [Garner	  1990:	  143].	  This	  view	  is	  further	  supported	  by	  metaphysical	  considerations	  (more	  on	  this	  below).	  Call	  it	  the	  metaphysical	  premise.	  The	  conclusion	  of	  these	  two	  premises	  is	  that	  our	  moral	  judgments	  are	  systematically	  mistaken.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  elegant	  and	  popular	  responses	  to	  this	  argument	  is	  the	  ‘companions	  in	  guilt’	  strategy.	  This	  strategy	  undermines	  the	  moral	  error	  theory	  by	  drawing	  an	  analogy	  between	  morality	  and	  some	  non-­‐moral	  region	  of	  discourse,	  typically	  that	  involving	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  [Stratton-­‐Lake	  2002,	  Shafer-­‐Landau	  2003,	  Bedke	  2010,	  Rowland	  2013].4	  The	  strategy	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  the	  following	  simple	  argument.	  The	  first	  premise	  –	  the	  parity	  
premise	  -­‐	  states	  that	  the	  metaphysical	  premise	  of	  the	  moral	  error-­‐theoretic	  argument	  (as	  above)	  entails	  that	  there	  are	  no	  categorically	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  The	  second	  premise	  –	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  -­‐	  states	  that	  there	  are	  some	  categorically	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  5	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  metaphysical	  premise	  of	  the	  moral	  error-­‐theoretic	  argument	  is	  false.	  So,	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  moral	  error	  theory	  is	  unsound.	  Companions	  in	  guilt	  arguments	  of	  this	  kind	  are	  increasingly	  influential	  in	  the	  present	  literature.	  In	  this	  article	  I	  show	  that	  they	  cannot	  succeed.	  This	  is	  good	  news	  for	  moral	  error	  theorists.	  	  My	  argument	  has	  three	  stages.	  In	  the	  first	  stage	  (section	  1)	  I	  claim	  that	  establishing	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  (in	  the	  dialectical	  context)	  requires	  understanding	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  as	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  In	  the	  second	  stage	  (section	  2)	  I	  argue	  that	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  aren’t	  just	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  So,	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  fails.	  In	  the	  third	  stage	  (section	  3)	  I	  show	  that	  even	  if	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  just	  evidential	  support	  relations,	  this	  undermines	  the	  parity	  premise	  and	  so,	  causes	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  to	  fail	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  It	  follows	  from	  these	  three	  steps	  that	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  must	  fail.	  I	  then	  show	  how	  my	  argument	  represents	  a	  development	  on	  the	  literature	  (section	  4).	  	  	  
1. The	  Epistemic	  Existence	  Premise	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  further	  precision	  see	  Shafer-­‐Landau	  [2003:	  15]	  discussion	  of	  ‘stance-­‐independence’	  	  3	  For	  useful	  critical	  discussion	  see	  Finlay	  [2008].	  4	  For	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘analogy	  based’	  and	  ‘entailment	  based’	  companions	  in	  guilt	  arguments	  see	  Lillehammer	  [2007].	  5	  Terminology	  from	  Cuneo	  [2007]	  (though	  my	  use	  differs	  in	  important	  ways	  from	  his).	  
	   3	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise.	  I	  show	  that	  successfully	  establishing	  this	  premise	  (in	  the	  dialectical	  context)	  requires	  that	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  just	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  premise	  of	  the	  overall	  argument	  of	  the	  article.	  	  	   (1) The	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  can	  be	  successfully	  established	  (in	  the	  dialectical	  context)	  only	  if	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  just	  are	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  	  As	  a	  preliminary,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  say	  something	  about	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  say	  very	  much	  however,	  as	  my	  basic	  argument	  does	  not	  turn	  on	  any	  of	  the	  fineries	  of	  this	  complex	  matter.	  By	  ‘evidential	  support	  relation’	  I’ll	  understand	  a	  probability-­‐raising	  relation	  that	  holds	  between	  the	  evidence,	  e,	  and	  some	  hypothesis,	  h.	  These	  probability-­‐raising	  relations	  are	  usually	  understood	  against	  a	  background	  of	  information:	  e	  raises	  (or	  lowers)	  the	  probability	  of	  h	  given	  some	  background	  information,	  b.	  Different	  probability	  measures	  make	  use	  of	  different	  background	  information.	  So,	  for	  example,	  e	  may	  raise	  the	  probability	  of	  h	  against	  the	  background	  of	  some	  agent’s	  prior	  beliefs.	  In	  this	  case,	  e	  can	  be	  said	  the	  raise	  subjective	  probability	  of	  h	  (for	  that	  agent).	  Alternatively,	  e	  may	  raise	  the	  probability	  of	  h	  against	  the	  background	  of	  some	  prior	  information	  that	  consists	  only	  of	  some	  specified	  set	  of	  true	  propositions.	  In	  this	  case,	  e	  can	  be	  said	  to	  raise	  the	  probability	  of	  h,	  though	  it	  may	  not	  raise	  the	  subjective	  probability	  of	  h	  (for	  any	  agent).	  In	  discussing	  (1),	  I	  won’t	  specify	  how	  I	  understand	  the	  background	  information	  and	  so,	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  probability.	  This	  is	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  that	  my	  argument	  is	  effective	  for	  those	  who	  are	  most	  comfortable	  understanding	  epistemic	  reasons	  subjectively	  as	  well	  as	  those	  who	  are	  not.	  I	  am	  happy	  to	  allow	  that	  there	  is	  a	  subjective	  sense	  of	  ‘epistemic	  reason’	  for	  which	  the	  relevant	  probability-­‐raising	  relation	  is	  against	  a	  background	  of	  prior	  beliefs,	  and	  a	  more	  objective	  sense	  for	  which	  the	  relevant	  probability-­‐raising	  relation	  to	  think	  about	  is	  restricted	  to	  some	  suitably	  specified	  set	  of	  true	  propositions.	  	  I	  now	  return	  to	  (1).	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  can	  be	  successfully	  established	  (in	  the	  dialectical	  context)	  only	  if	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  just	  are	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  The	  key	  point	  here	  is	  in	  parentheses.	  One	  might	  think	  that	  establishing	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  –	  that	  is,	  establishing	  that	  there	  are	  some	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  -­‐	  is	  straightforward.	  Simply	  point	  to	  an	  apparent	  instance.	  Suppose	  I	  look	  at	  the	  departure	  board.	  It	  says	  that	  my	  train	  leaves	  at	  0825.	  Surely	  this	  evidential	  consideration	  is	  a	  normative	  reason	  for	  me	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  train	  leaves	  at	  0825.	  And	  surely	  it	  is	  so	  whether	  or	  not	  I	  want	  to	  believe	  that	  my	  train	  leaves	  at	  0825.	  So	  the	  normative	  reason	  is	  also	  categorical.	  So	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  is	  true.	  So	  there	  are	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  	  In	  the	  present	  dialectical	  context	  however,	  this	  argument	  would	  of	  little	  use.	  Moral	  error	  theorists	  are	  already	  committed	  to	  denying	  the	  existence	  of	  categorical	  reasons	  for	  action	  and	  thereby	  biting	  all	  kinds	  of	  otherwise	  unattractive	  bullets	  about	  everyday	  thought	  and	  talk.	  They	  are	  committed,	  for	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example,	  to	  denying	  that	  torturing	  the	  innocent	  is	  morally	  wrong.	  They	  are	  unlikely	  to	  flinch	  at	  biting	  the	  bullet	  as	  regards	  the	  0825	  to	  London.	  The	  moral	  error	  theorist	  will	  simply	  deny	  that	  she	  possesses	  a	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  her	  train	  leaves	  at	  0825.	  She	  will	  deny	  this	  precisely	  because	  she	  denies	  the	  existence	  of	  categorical	  reasons.	  What	  she	  will	  not	  deny	  is	  that	  the	  departure	  board	  provides	  evidential	  support	  that	  the	  train	  will	  leave	  at	  0825.	  But	  she	  will	  deny	  that	  this	  entails	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reason	  for	  belief.	  	  Importantly	  though,	  this	  denial	  is	  not	  an	  option	  if	  evidential	  support	  relations	  just	  are	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  If	  there	  is	  an	  identity	  here,	  the	  error	  theorist	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  evidential	  support	  relation	  without	  thereby	  committing	  herself	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  categorical	  normative	  epistemic	  reason	  for	  belief.	  This	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  argument	  for	  (1).	  Merely	  citing	  instances	  of	  ‘everyday’	  categorical	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  is	  dialectically	  insufficient	  against	  the	  error	  theorist.	  It	  is	  insufficient	  as	  the	  error	  theorist	  will	  admit	  the	  existence	  of	  evidential	  support	  relations	  but	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  categorical	  normative	  reasons.	  What	  would	  be	  necessary	  in	  the	  present	  dialectical	  context	  is	  to	  shortcut	  this	  response	  by	  showing	  that	  evidential	  support	  relations	  just	  are	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  	  This	  basic	  point	  is	  borne	  out	  in	  some	  of	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  arguments	  that	  get	  offered	  for	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  the	  three	  ‘undesirable	  results’	  that	  Terence	  Cuneo	  [2007:	  Ch.	  5]	  claims	  to	  follow	  from	  the	  denial	  of	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  (or	  as	  he	  calls	  it	  ‘epistemic	  nihilism’).	  The	  first	  is	  that	  there	  could	  be	  no	  epistemic	  reason	  to	  believe	  anything,	  including	  the	  epistemic	  nihilism.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  there	  could	  be	  no	  epistemic	  ‘merits	  or	  demerits’.	  The	  third	  is	  that	  there	  could	  be	  no	  valid	  arguments	  for	  anything,	  including	  the	  epistemic	  nihilism.	  These	  undesirable	  results	  are	  intended	  to	  motivate	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise.	  But	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  doing	  so	  –	  I	  shall	  now	  claim	  -­‐	  is	  also	  dependent	  on	  understanding	  evidential	  support	  relations	  as	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  also	  dependent	  on	  (1).	  	  To	  see	  this,	  begin	  by	  thinking	  about	  the	  first	  undesirable	  result	  –	  that	  if	  the	  epistemic	  error	  theory	  is	  true,	  then	  there	  could	  be	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  it.	  This	  gives	  epistemic	  nihilism	  the	  ring	  of	  self-­‐defeat	  or	  internal	  inconsistency.	  But,	  as	  a	  number	  of	  error	  theorists	  have	  noted,	  this	  undesirable	  result	  does	  not	  in	  fact	  show	  epistemic	  nihilism	  to	  be	  either	  self-­‐defeating	  or	  internally	  inconsistent.	  An	  epistemic	  error	  theorist	  can	  admit	  that	  there	  is	  no	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reason	  to	  believe	  epistemic	  nihilism.	  But	  she	  can	  deny	  that	  this	  undermines	  the	  truth	  of	  epistemic	  nihilism.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  there	  is	  no	  categorical	  normative	  reason	  to	  believe	  a	  theory	  because	  there	  are	  no	  categorical	  normative	  reasons.	  Yet	  the	  theory	  may	  still	  be	  true.	  This	  claim	  is	  explicit	  in	  a	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number	  of	  authors	  who	  are	  skeptical	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  approach	  [Fletcher	  2009,	  Streumer	  2013,	  Olson	  2013].6	  	  This	  dialectical	  move	  is	  only	  open	  to	  the	  error	  theorist	  however	  if	  she	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between	  evidential	  support	  relations	  and	  categorically	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  If	  this	  distinction	  is	  not	  available,	  then	  the	  first	  undesirable	  result	  entails	  the	  third	  (on	  the	  assumption	  that	  valid	  arguments	  require	  evidential	  support	  relations	  to	  obtain	  between	  their	  premises	  and	  conclusion).7	  And	  this	  would	  be	  a	  very	  troubling	  result	  for	  the	  error	  theorist	  indeed	  –	  perhaps	  sufficient	  to	  warrant	  rejection	  of	  epistemic	  nihilism	  even	  from	  her	  perspective.	  So,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  turns	  on	  the	  identification	  of	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  with	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  	  This	  is	  further	  illustrated	  by	  reflection	  on	  the	  second	  undesirable	  result.	  According	  to	  this	  result,	  epistemic	  nihilism	  entails	  that	  there	  could	  be	  no	  epistemic	  merits	  or	  demerits	  including	  justification,	  rationality	  and	  warrant.	  This	  is	  a	  worrying	  result.	  But	  once	  again	  it	  would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  in	  the	  present	  dialectical	  context.	  Just	  as	  the	  moral	  error	  theorist	  will	  deny	  that	  torturing	  the	  innocent	  is	  wrong	  precisely	  because	  she	  denies	  that	  there	  are	  any	  categorical	  reasons,	  so,	  she	  may	  deny	  that	  certain	  beliefs	  are	  justified,	  rational,	  warranted	  (etc)	  just	  because	  there	  are	  no	  categorical	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  This,	  she	  will	  maintain,	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  existence	  of	  evidential	  support	  relations	  holding	  in	  relation	  to	  those	  beliefs.	  Once	  again,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  will	  turn	  on	  the	  identification	  of	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  with	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  These	  authors	  may	  accept	  that	  there	  are	  hypothetical	  normative	  reasons	  to	  believe	  the	  epistemic	  error	  theory	  [Olson	  2013:	  160].	  This	  allows	  them	  to	  respond	  to	  Bedke’s	  worry	  (on	  behalf	  of	  companions	  in	  guilt	  theorists)	  that	  “If	  we	  dispense	  with	  support	  or	  favouring	  relations,	  we	  no	  longer	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  say	  anything	  about	  which	  beliefs	  one	  should	  hold	  based	  on	  one’s	  evidence.”	  [Bedke	  2010:	  52].	  Error	  theorists	  should	  claim	  that	  there	  exist	  hypothetical	  reasons	  for	  evidence-­‐based	  belief	  
7	  Cuneo	  is	  working	  with	  a	  conception	  of	  a	  valid	  argument	  as	  “in	  the	  paradigmatic	  case”	  premises	  “offered	  in	  support	  its	  conclusion	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  offered	  as	  evidential	  support	  for	  [it].”	  [Cuneo	  2007:	  121].	  One	  might	  wonder,	  following	  Harman	  [1986],	  whether	  it	  is	  really	  the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  valid	  arguments	  so	  understood	  that	  would	  follow	  from	  the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  Cuneo	  is	  sensitive	  to	  this	  worry.	  He	  suggests	  that	  if	  Harman	  is	  right	  to	  distinguish	  arguments	  from	  inferences,	  then	  it	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  ‘good	  inference’	  (and	  not	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  valid	  argument)	  that	  would	  be	  undermined	  by	  epistemic	  nihilism.	  Cuneo	  takes	  this	  to	  be	  an	  ‘undesirable	  result’	  in	  its	  own	  right.	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An	  important	  case-­‐study	  of	  the	  error-­‐theorist’s	  argument	  here	  concerns	  
knowledge.	  Richard	  Rowland	  [2013]	  considers	  the	  implication	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  epistemic	  merits	  and	  demerits	  for	  knowledge	  ascriptions.	  Knowledge,	  he	  claims,	  entails	  justification.	  If	  one	  knows	  that	  p,	  then	  one	  is	  justified	  in	  believing	  that	  p.	  And	  an	  epistemic	  error	  theory	  entails	  that,	  for	  any	  p,	  one	  isn’t	  justified	  in	  believing	  p.	  So,	  the	  epistemic	  error	  theory	  entails	  that	  no-­‐one	  knows	  anything:	  global	  skepticism.	  This	  case	  is	  important	  as	  it	  might	  be	  thought	  to	  represent	  a	  counter-­‐example	  to	  (1).	  This	  is	  because	  Rowland’s	  argument	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  rely	  on	  an	  identity	  between	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  evidential	  support	  relations	  in	  generating	  an	  absurdity	  for	  the	  epistemic	  nihilist.	  His	  argument	  simply	  relies	  on	  knowledge	  entailing	  justification.	  	  Consider,	  however,	  how	  an	  error	  theorist	  will	  respond	  to	  Rowland.	  The	  error	  theorist	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  really	  two	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  justification	  entailed	  by	  knowledge.	  We	  can	  think	  of	  it	  merely	  in	  terms	  of	  evidential	  support	  relations,	  or	  we	  can	  think	  of	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  categorical	  normative	  reasons.	  Understood	  as	  the	  latter,	  one	  possesses	  justification	  for	  a	  proposition	  only	  if	  one	  possesses	  some	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  proposition.	  The	  epistemic	  error	  theorist	  will	  deny	  that	  this	  ever	  happens.	  Understood	  as	  the	  former	  however,	  one	  possesses	  justification	  for	  a	  proposition	  only	  if	  one	  possesses	  evidence	  (of	  some	  degree)	  for	  the	  proposition.	  The	  epistemic	  error	  theorist	  will	  be	  happy	  to	  accept	  that	  this	  does	  happen.	  In	  short,	  she	  will	  claim	  that	  we	  possess	  evidence	  for	  some	  of	  our	  beliefs,	  but	  not	  categorical	  normative	  reasons	  to	  hold	  those	  beliefs.	  And	  so,	  we	  do	  have	  knowledge.	  This	  might	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  substantial	  bullet	  to	  bite	  –	  it	  perhaps	  requires	  a	  revision	  of	  ordinary	  thoughts	  about	  knowledge.	  But	  recall	  that	  moral	  error	  theorists	  have	  already	  bitten	  the	  bullet	  in	  accepting	  that	  that	  torturing	  the	  innocent	  for	  fun	  is	  not	  morally	  wrong.	  Comparatively,	  the	  response	  to	  Rowland	  outlined	  above	  doesn’t	  look	  too	  bad.	  	  	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  has	  been	  to	  show	  that	  if	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  theorist	  is	  to	  establish	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  (given	  the	  dialectical	  context),	  then	  she	  must	  identify	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  with	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  In	  the	  above	  discussion	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  made	  a	  presumptive	  case	  for	  this	  conditional	  conclusion.	  So,	  I	  take	  there	  to	  be	  a	  presumptive	  case	  in	  favour	  of	  (1).	  	  	  
2. Epistemic	  Reasons	  for	  Belief	  Aren’t	  Evidential	  Support	  Relations	  	  In	  the	  next	  two	  sections	  I	  show	  that	  (1)	  leads	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy.	  The	  most	  obvious	  way	  to	  do	  this	  is	  by	  establishing	  the	  following	  additional	  premise:	  	   (2) Categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  not	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  	  If	  (2)	  is	  true,	  then	  we	  have	  sufficient	  resource	  to	  reject	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  conjunction	  of	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  entails	  that	  one	  of	  the	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two	  premises	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  cannot	  be	  successfully	  established.	  Specifically:	  	   (3) The	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  cannot	  be	  successfully	  established	  (in	  the	  dialectical	  context).	  	  The	  contentious	  premise	  here	  is	  (2).	  It	  is	  sometimes	  thought	  that	  the	  identity	  between	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  evidential	  support	  relations	  is	  obvious	  (perhaps	  even	  analytic).	  So	  how	  can	  one	  plausibly	  deny	  (2)?	  My	  basic	  claim	  is	  that	  whilst	  one	  could	  reasonably	  claim	  that	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  evidential	  support	  relations	  are	  the	  very	  same	  thing,	  one	  would	  thereby	  be	  making	  use	  of	  a	  non-­‐normative	  sense	  of	  ‘epistemic	  reason	  for	  belief’.	  This	  basic	  claim	  has	  been	  mooted	  by	  a	  number	  of	  authors	  who	  are	  skeptical	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy.8	  	  Begin	  by	  noting	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  claim	  has	  precedent.	  There	  are	  many	  standard	  uses	  of	  ‘reason’	  that	  are	  clearly	  non-­‐normative.	  Causal,	  motivating	  and	  explanatory	  reasons	  all	  fit	  this	  description.	  More	  relevant	  are	  ‘institutional	  reasons’	  such	  as	  the	  reasons	  associated	  with	  games	  and	  sports,	  etiquette	  and	  the	  law	  [Joyce	  2001].	  In	  these	  cases,	  one	  may	  possess	  a	  reason	  of	  the	  relevant	  sort	  without	  thereby	  possessing	  a	  normative	  reason.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  country	  with	  unjust	  laws,	  one	  may	  possess	  a	  legal	  reason	  to	  perform	  some	  reprehensible	  act,	  though	  one	  possesses	  no	  normative	  reason	  to	  do	  so	  [Lillehammer	  2002].	  In	  order	  for	  one	  to	  possess	  a	  normative	  reason	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  that	  one	  also	  possesses	  a	  reason	  to	  ‘take	  part’	  in	  the	  relevant	  institution.	  It	  is	  at	  least	  coherent	  to	  think	  that	  epistemic	  reasons	  are	  of	  this	  kind.	  If	  so,	  it	  is	  coherent	  for	  one	  to	  possess	  evidence	  for	  some	  proposition,	  though	  no	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reason	  to	  believe	  it.	  One	  would	  also	  require	  a	  reason	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  business	  of	  believing	  (the	  truth)	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  proposition.	  9	  	  To	  see	  why	  this	  reading	  is	  actually	  plausible	  begin	  by	  thinking	  about	  what	  a	  normative	  reason	  is.	  There	  is	  no	  settled	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  But	  one	  popular	  (and	  feasible)	  place	  to	  start	  is	  with	  the	  relations	  of	  reasons	  to	  facts	  about	  what	  one	  ought	  to	  do	  or	  to	  believe.	  According	  to	  a	  popular	  version	  of	  this	  claim,	  a	  normative	  reason	  for	  believing	  a	  proposition	  is	  evidence	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  believe	  it.10	  Let’s	  start	  by	  working	  with	  this	  account.	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  should	  make	  us	  question	  the	  identity	  between	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  To	  see	  this,	  suppose	  that	  we	  conjoin	  (i)	  the	  above	  account	  of	  normative	  reasons	  with	  (ii)	  an	  identity	  between	  evidential	  support	  relations	  and	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  The	  result	  would	  be	  that	  (iii)	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  read	  Fletcher	  [2009]	  in	  this	  way.	  9	  One	  might	  argue	  that	  engaging	  in	  the	  ‘institution	  of	  believing’	  is	  relevantly	  disanalogous	  from	  other	  institutional	  practices	  by	  being	  non-­‐optional	  [cf.	  Railton	  2005].	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  whether	  this	  is	  true,	  but	  in	  any	  case	  it	  would	  not	  be	  of	  any	  obvious	  normatively	  significance	  –	  a	  point	  forcefully	  made	  by	  Enoch	  [2011a].	  10	  Kearns	  and	  Star	  [2009].	  A	  variant	  reads	  reasons	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  one	  ought	  to	  respond	  in	  some	  way	  [Broome	  2013].	  My	  arguments	  apply	  equally	  to	  both.	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possession	  of	  evidence	  for	  a	  proposition	  is	  always	  evidence	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  believe	  that	  proposition.	  Although	  some	  philosophers	  have	  accepted	  (iii),	  I	  think	  it	  highly	  implausible.	  The	  basic	  reason	  for	  this	  stems	  from	  reflection	  on	  so-­‐called	  ‘trivial	  truths’	  –	  propositions	  that	  it	  is	  of	  no	  practical	  value	  (or	  disvalue)	  to	  hold	  a	  true	  (or	  false)	  belief	  about.11	  Suppose	  that	  I	  possess,	  and	  am	  aware	  of	  possessing,	  evidence,	  e,	  that	  bears	  on	  some	  proposition,	  p.	  But	  suppose	  that	  I	  have	  no	  interest	  in	  arriving	  at	  a	  true	  or	  evidentially	  supported	  belief	  about	  that	  proposition.	  And	  suppose	  that	  it	  would	  not	  serve	  any	  practical	  end	  for	  me	  to	  do	  so.	  If	  one	  nevertheless	  maintains	  that	  e	  is	  evidence	  that	  I	  ought	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  (and	  not	  merely	  that	  e	  is	  evidence	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  p),	  the	  burden	  is	  surely	  very	  much	  on	  them	  to	  explain	  why.	  So	  –	  on	  the	  present	  understanding	  of	  normative	  reasons	  –	  the	  burden	  is	  very	  much	  on	  one	  who	  denies	  (2)	  rather	  than	  on	  one	  who	  accepts	  it.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  given	  that	  the	  institutional	  model	  of	  epistemic	  reasons	  is	  already	  on	  the	  table.	  For	  on	  this	  model	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  construed	  as	  evidential	  support	  relations	  will	  be	  normative	  	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  will	  be	  evidence	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  believe	  in	  some	  way	  -­‐	  only	  if	  one	  possesses	  a	  prior	  reason	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  institutional	  practice	  in	  question.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  trivial	  truths	  no	  such	  reason	  exists.	  So,	  the	  institutional	  model	  explains	  the	  intuitive	  problem	  with	  trivial	  truths	  without	  fuss.	  Of	  course,	  this	  very	  simple	  argument	  requires	  further	  support.	  There	  is	  a	  substantial	  literature	  that	  I	  can’t	  claim	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  it	  here.12	  But	  the	  burden	  would	  very	  much	  be	  on	  one	  who	  wants	  to	  establish	  a	  positive	  claim	  here.	  	  	  This	  basic	  thought	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  analyses	  of	  reason	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  one	  
ought	  to	  believe.	  Another	  popular	  analysis	  of	  a	  normative	  reason	  is	  the	  ‘favouring’	  account	  whereby	  a	  normative	  reason	  is	  a	  consideration	  that	  counts	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  response	  [Scanlon	  1998].	  So	  understood,	  a	  normative	  reason	  for	  believing	  a	  proposition	  is	  a	  consideration	  that	  counts	  in	  favour	  of	  believing	  that	  proposition.	  This	  understanding	  –	  I	  claim	  -­‐	  also	  places	  a	  burden	  on	  one	  who	  would	  argue	  that	  evidential	  support	  relations	  are	  normative	  reasons.	  To	  see	  this,	  suppose	  that	  we	  conjoin	  (iv)	  the	  favouring	  account	  of	  a	  normative	  reason	  with	  (v)	  an	  identity	  between	  evidential	  support	  relations	  and	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  The	  result	  would	  be	  that	  (vi)	  the	  possession	  of	  evidence	  for	  a	  conclusion	  always	  counts	  in	  favour	  of	  believing	  that	  proposition.	  Once	  again,	  although	  some	  philosophers	  may	  accept	  this,	  I	  find	  it	  highly	  implausible	  owing	  to	  reflection	  on	  trivial	  truths.	  Possession	  of	  evidence	  for	  a	  trivial	  truth	  certainly	  counts	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  trivial	  truth.	  But	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  that	  it	  counts	  in	  favour	  of	  believing	  that	  truth.	  For	  it	  to	  do	  so	  would	  require	  an	  additional	  premise	  that	  considerations	  that	  count	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  relevant	  propositions	  (perhaps	  ‘considered’	  propositions)	  also	  count	  in	  favour	  of	  believing	  them.	  And	  whilst	  I	  don’t	  have	  any	  knockdown	  argument	  against	  this	  premise,	  I	  don’t	  know	  of	  any	  good	  reason	  to	  accept	  it	  -­‐	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  It	  is	  questionable	  whether	  there	  are	  any	  such	  beliefs	  [Kornblith	  2002,	  Schroeder	  2007].	  This	  doesn’t	  matter	  for	  present	  purposes	  provided	  such	  cases	  are	  metaphysically	  possible.	  12	  For	  a	  useful	  back-­‐and-­‐forth	  see	  Kelly	  [2003,	  2007]	  and	  Leite	  [2007].	  See	  also	  Steglich-­‐Petersen	  [2011].	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surely	  on	  one	  to	  establish	  it.	  Trivial	  truths	  provide	  a	  prima	  facie	  counter-­‐example.	  And	  once	  again,	  this	  burden	  is	  avoidable	  on	  the	  institutional	  model.	  	  These	  considerations	  lead	  me	  to	  accept	  (2)	  and	  hence	  to	  reject	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy.	  I	  acknowledge	  however	  that	  these	  considerations	  are	  unlikely	  to	  convert	  philosophers	  who	  already	  reject	  (2).	  The	  result	  is	  stalemate.	  I	  won’t	  press	  the	  point.	  Nor	  does	  it	  matter	  for	  my	  purposes.	  This	  is	  because	  –	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  the	  next	  section	  -­‐	  these	  philosophers	  are	  committed	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  in	  any	  case,	  albeit	  for	  a	  very	  different	  reason.	  	  
3. And	  if	  They	  Are,	  then	  The	  Parity	  Premise	  is	  False	  	  I	  have	  argued	  above	  that	  if	  (2)	  is	  true,	  then	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  fails.	  I	  now	  argue	  that	  if	  (2)	  is	  false,	  then	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  also	  fails	  (albeit	  for	  a	  different	  reason).	  So,	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  must	  fail.	  This	  is	  an	  extremely	  strong	  result.	  To	  see	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  argument	  suppose	  that	  (2)	  is	  false.	  In	  other	  words:	  	   (4) Categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  argue	  that	  if	  (4)	  is	  true	  it	  follows	  that:	  	   (5) The	  parity	  premise	  is	  false.	  	  Why	  would	  (4)	  entail	  (5)?	  My	  basic	  claim	  is	  that	  it	  would	  do	  so	  by	  providing	  a	  
reduction	  of	  categorical	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons;	  a	  reduction	  which	  is	  not	  available	  for	  moral	  reasons.	  This	  requires	  a	  little	  stage-­‐setting.	  	  Begin	  by	  thinking	  again	  about	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  moral	  error	  theory.	  This	  argument	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  denial	  of	  categorical	  reasons	  (‘the	  metaphysical	  premise’).	  The	  important	  point	  for	  present	  purposes	  concerns	  why	  the	  existence	  of	  these	  reasons	  is	  often	  denied:	  what	  is	  the	  problem	  with	  categorical	  reasons?	  The	  most	  prominent	  problem	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  that	  categorical	  reasons	  for	  action	  would	  be	  irreducibly	  normative.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  would	  not	  be	  reducible	  to	  non-­‐normative	  (i.e.	  ‘descriptive’)	  facts	  or	  properties	  [cf.	  Streumer	  2008].	  And	  –	  for	  independent,	  metaphysical	  and	  epistemological	  reasons	  –	  irreducibly	  normative	  entities	  are	  thought	  not	  to	  exist.	  My	  claim	  in	  support	  of	  (5)	  is	  that	  this	  opens	  up	  a	  disanalogy	  between	  moral	  reasons	  and	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  The	  disanalogy	  is	  that	  if	  (4)	  is	  true,	  then	  epistemic	  reasons	  would	  be	  categorical	  and	  normative	  though	  not	  irreducible.	  They	  would	  be	  reducible	  to	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  So,	  epistemic	  reasons	  may	  be	  categorical	  without	  being	  metaphysically	  and	  epistemologically	  problematic.	  This	  would	  warrant	  rejection	  of	  the	  parity	  premise.	  Hence	  (5).	  	  A	  useful	  way	  to	  get	  clear	  on	  my	  central	  claim	  here	  is	  to	  ask	  why	  the	  categoricity	  of	  moral	  reasons	  (supposedly)	  renders	  them	  irreducible.	  As	  I	  understand	  it,	  the	  basic	  argument	  is	  abductive.	  The	  first	  premise	  is	  that	  (by	  definition)	  categorical	  reasons	  for	  action	  aren’t	  reducible	  to	  facts	  about	  our	  desires	  and	  the	  means	  that	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would	  promote	  them.	  The	  second	  premise	  is	  that	  this	  reduction	  (i.e.	  to	  desires	  and	  means)	  is	  much	  the	  most	  plausible	  candidate	  for	  a	  reduction	  of	  reasons	  for	  action.	  The	  abductively	  supported	  conclusion	  is	  that	  categorical	  reasons	  for	  action	  are	  irreducible.	  This	  opens	  up	  a	  disanalogy	  because	  if	  we	  assume	  (4)	  then	  there	  is	  no	  such	  abductive	  argument	  for	  the	  irreducibility	  of	  categorical	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  If	  we	  assume	  (4)	  there	  is	  a	  very	  good	  candidate	  reductive-­‐base	  for	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief:	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  So,	  if	  we	  assume	  (4)	  then	  the	  categoricity	  of	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  does	  not	  support	  epistemic	  nihilism.	  And	  this	  is	  the	  case	  even	  if	  the	  categoricity	  of	  moral	  reasons	  still	  supports	  a	  moral	  error	  theory.	  So,	  the	  parity	  premise	  is	  undermined.	  	  I	  now	  discuss	  two	  objections	  to	  this	  argument.	  The	  first	  objection	  is	  that	  identifying	  categorical	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  with	  evidential	  support	  relations	  wouldn’t	  be	  reductive	  –	  or	  at	  least	  not	  in	  the	  required	  sense	  -­‐	  at	  all.	  One	  way	  of	  phrasing	  this	  worry	  is	  as	  follows.	  The	  problem	  with	  irreducible	  normative	  facts	  is	  that	  they	  are	  metaphysically	  queer	  and/or	  epistemologically	  inaccessible.	  But	  aren’t	  facts	  about	  probabilities	  just	  as	  bad?	  And	  so,	  doesn’t	  a	  ‘reduction’	  of	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  to	  probabilities	  lose	  the	  benefits	  that	  a	  reduction	  was	  meant	  to	  provide?	  I	  concede	  that	  there	  is	  something	  to	  be	  said	  for	  this	  worry.	  But	  I	  think	  that	  it	  can	  be	  set-­‐aside	  for	  present	  purposes.	  Firstly,	  the	  queerness	  (or	  not)	  of	  probabilities	  is	  a	  separate	  issue;	  some	  moral	  error	  theorists	  may	  accept	  it,	  others	  may	  not.	  In	  support	  of	  this,	  note	  that	  arguments	  for	  the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  irreducible	  normative	  entities	  do	  not	  typically	  turn	  on	  considerations	  that	  apply	  equally	  to	  probabilities	  –	  they	  may,	  for	  example,	  turn	  on	  the	  supposed	  incoherence	  of	  ‘demands	  without	  a	  demander’	  [Garner	  1990,	  Marks	  2013].	  Secondly,	  probabilities	  are	  arguably	  on	  a	  better	  footing	  on	  ontological	  grounds	  in	  any	  case:	  they	  are	  unquestionably	  indispensable	  to	  best	  science	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  is	  less	  clearly	  true	  (if	  true	  at	  all)	  of	  normative	  entities.13	  	  	  There	  is	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  making	  this	  objection	  (i.e.	  that	  identifying	  categorical	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  with	  evidential	  support	  relations	  wouldn’t	  be	  reductive).	  It	  is	  that	  evidential	  support	  relations	  shouldn’t	  be	  explained	  non-­‐normatively.	  Specifically,	  it	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  facts	  about	  probabilities	  are	  best	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  it	  is	  reasonable	  for	  agents	  to	  believe.	  There	  are	  several	  points	  to	  make	  in	  response	  to	  this	  worry.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  prima	  facie,	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  theory	  and	  the	  normative	  interpretation	  of	  probability	  are	  independent	  of	  one	  another.	  It	  would	  be	  an	  interesting	  result	  for	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  theorist	  –	  and,	  I	  think,	  an	  unwelcome	  one	  from	  her	  perspective	  –	  if	  her	  strategy	  rested	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  normative	  theory	  of	  probability.	  	  A	  second,	  more	  substantive	  response	  owes	  to	  Chris	  Heathwood	  [2009].	  Heathwood	  defends	  a	  reduction	  of	  epistemic	  reasons	  to	  evidential	  support	  relations	  (understood	  in	  terms	  of	  probabilities)	  and	  considers	  the	  above	  worry.	  His	  response	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  modified	  Euthyphro	  dilemma.	  Let	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  I	  acknowledge	  that	  it	  is	  sometimes	  claimed	  that	  normative	  entities	  are	  indispensable	  to	  best	  science	  [e.g.	  Macarthur	  2010].	  I	  don’t	  buy	  this	  nor,	  for	  what	  it’s	  worth	  do	  many	  contemporary	  moral	  realists	  [e.g.	  Enoch	  2011b,	  Parfit	  2011,	  Scanlon	  2014].	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evidence	  e	  be	  that	  the	  streets	  are	  wet	  and	  hypothesis	  h	  be	  that	  it	  rained	  last	  night.	  Should	  we	  think	  that	  e	  probablifies	  h	  because	  e	  renders	  it	  reasonable	  to	  increase	  one’s	  confidence	  in	  h?	  Or	  should	  we	  think	  that	  e	  renders	  it	  reasonable	  to	  increase	  one’s	  confidence	  in	  h	  because	  e	  probabilifies	  h?	  The	  latter	  interpretation	  is,	  he	  claims,	  preferable.	  This	  seems	  correct	  –	  as	  least	  pre-­‐theoretically.	  What	  explains	  why	  seeing	  wet	  streets	  makes	  it	  reasonable	  for	  us	  to	  increase	  our	  confidence	  that	  it	  rained	  last	  night	  is	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  former	  is	  raised	  by	  the	  latter	  (and	  not	  the	  other	  way	  round).	  	  	  I’ll	  now	  consider	  a	  second	  objection	  to	  my	  claim	  that	  (4)	  entails	  (5).	  It	  is	  that	  if	  we	  assume	  (4),	  then	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  assume	  that	  there	  is	  an	  abductive	  case	  for	  the	  irreducibility	  of	  categorical	  moral	  reasons.	  According	  to	  this	  objection,	  assuming	  (4)	  amounts	  to	  assuming	  that	  categorical	  reasons	  can	  be	  reduced.	  And	  so,	  we	  are	  equally	  well	  entitled	  to	  assume	  that	  categorical	  moral	  reasons	  can	  be	  reduced	  too;	  perhaps	  by	  a	  sophisticated	  conceptual	  analysis	  (‘Canberra-­‐planning’),	  perhaps	  by	  a	  posteriori	  identity.	  Another	  way	  of	  putting	  this	  objection	  –	  used	  by	  both	  Stratton-­‐Lake	  and	  Rowland	  -­‐	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  apparent	  arbitrariness	  of	  admitting	  that	  a	  reduction	  of	  categorical	  reasons	  for	  belief	  is	  possible,	  but	  that	  an	  analogous	  reduction	  of	  moral	  reasons	  isn’t.	  Given	  that	  the	  relation	  is	  the	  same	  in	  both	  cases	  (i.e.	  being	  a	  categorical	  reason)	  why	  should	  a	  mere	  change	  in	  the	  relata	  (i.e.	  action	  in	  one	  case,	  belief	  in	  the	  other)	  mark	  a	  metaphysical	  difference	  [Stratton-­‐Lake	  2002,	  Bedke	  2010,	  Rowland	  2013]?	  An	  explanation	  is	  owed	  here.	  Although	  this	  objection	  is	  fair,	  the	  resources	  available	  in	  response	  to	  it	  are	  rich	  –	  much	  richer	  than	  the	  rhetorical	  question	  above	  presupposes.	  I’ll	  briefly	  sketch	  three	  different	  kinds	  of	  explanation	  that	  are	  available.	  Interestingly,	  some	  of	  these	  responses	  may	  be	  appealing	  to	  some	  error	  theorists,	  other	  responses	  to	  other	  error	  theorists.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  may	  turn	  on	  subtleties	  of	  the	  error-­‐theoretic	  view	  against	  which	  it	  is	  targeted	  –	  a	  matter	  that	  may	  vary	  from	  case-­‐to-­‐case.	  	  	  The	  first	  response	  is	  premised	  on	  a	  difference	  between	  action	  and	  belief	  at	  the	  level	  of	  motivation.	  On	  standard	  (e.g.	  Humean)	  approaches,	  one	  can	  come	  to	  (intentionally)	  act	  in	  some	  way	  only	  if	  one	  possesses	  the	  relevant	  motivational	  state	  such	  as	  a	  desire	  or	  other	  pro-­‐attitude.	  This	  is	  not	  true	  of	  belief.	  On	  standard	  models,	  one	  can	  come	  to	  form	  a	  belief	  without	  any	  such	  desire	  or	  pro-­‐attitude.	  This	  psychological	  asymmetry	  under-­‐writes	  an	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  prospects	  of	  reducing	  categorical	  reasons	  for	  action	  and	  for	  belief	  respectively.	  To	  see	  this,	  suppose	  that	  one	  holds	  –	  as	  many	  error	  theorists	  do	  [Mackie	  1977]	  -­‐	  a	  motivational	  constraint	  on	  something’s	  counting	  as	  a	  normative	  reason;	  roughly,	  motivational	  internalism.	  It	  would	  follow	  (via	  a	  familiar	  argument)	  that	  categorical	  reasons	  for	  action	  are	  a	  non-­‐starter.14	  This	  is	  because	  such	  (putative)	  reasons	  couldn’t	  both	  be	  categorical	  (i.e.	  desire-­‐independent)	  and	  motivational.	  But,	  owing	  to	  the	  non-­‐necessity	  of	  desires	  for	  belief-­‐formation	  no	  such	  argument	  follows	  as	  regards	  categorical	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  Now	  of	  course	  there	  are	  difficulties	  here	  that	  a	  companions	  in	  guilt	  theorist	  will	  note.	  She	  might,	  for	  example,	  question	  to	  truth	  of	  motivational	  internalism	  or	  its	  applicability	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  See	  Shafer-­‐Landau	  [2003:	  180]	  for	  a	  clear	  presentation.	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reasons	  for	  belief.	  Fair	  enough.	  Insofar	  as	  she	  does	  so	  however,	  she	  will	  be	  
directly	  rejecting	  moral	  error	  theories	  rather	  than	  proceeding	  via	  a	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy.	  	  A	  second,	  slightly	  more	  speculative,	  response	  draws	  on	  a	  further	  potential	  difference	  between	  belief	  and	  action.	  It	  is	  often	  claimed	  that	  belief	  ‘aims’	  at	  truth	  (or	  knowledge)	  and	  that	  this	  feature	  of	  belief	  grounds	  the	  existence	  of	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  	  Roughly	  speaking,	  the	  thought	  is	  that	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  belief	  having	  the	  ‘aim’	  that	  it	  does	  that	  there	  exist	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  	  Of	  course	  this	  claim	  requires	  unpacking.	  What	  exactly	  is	  an	  ‘aim’	  and	  how	  does	  it	  ground	  the	  existence	  of	  reasons	  to	  hold	  the	  state	  for	  which	  it	  is	  an	  aim?	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  responses	  to	  these	  questions	  and	  a	  full	  treatment	  is	  not	  possible	  here.	  But	  if	  some	  answer	  is	  forthcoming,	  then	  a	  response	  to	  the	  above	  challenge	  opens	  up.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  is	  feasible	  that	  action-­‐guiding	  mental	  states	  do	  not	  have	  an	  analogous	  aim	  –	  or	  at	  least	  not	  one	  that	  could	  ground	  the	  existence	  of	  anything	  like	  moral	  reasons	  [Darwall	  2003,	  Millar	  2004,	  Lillehammer	  2007,	  FitzPatrick	  2009,	  Cowie	  2014b].	  Here	  is	  one	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  it:	  a	  belief	  ‘goes	  right	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  it	  is’	  (i.e.	  fulfills	  its	  aim)	  just	  in	  case	  it	  represents	  veridically.	  A	  desire	  or	  action	  guiding	  mental	  state,	  by	  contrast,	  goes	  right	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  that	  it	  is	  (i.e.	  fulfills	  its	  aim)	  just	  in	  case	  it	  is	  satisfied.15	  If	  we	  think	  along	  these	  lines,	  then	  an	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  grounds	  of	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  and	  moral	  reasons	  respectively	  opens	  up.	  We	  can	  potentially	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  the	  grounds	  of	  epistemic	  reasons	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  belief.	  But	  no	  such	  account	  is	  obviously	  forthcoming	  for	  moral	  reasons	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  action	  or	  action-­‐guiding	  mental	  states.16	  	  I	  acknowledge	  that	  this	  response	  requires	  substantial	  work	  to	  rise	  to	  the	  level	  of	  an	  argument.	  Ultimately,	  it	  may	  prove	  that	  categorical	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  can’t	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  have	  suggested,	  or	  that	  there	  is	  no	  relevant	  disanalogy	  with	  action.17	  But	  at	  the	  very	  least	  there	  is	  an	  issue	  to	  be	  discussed	  here	  –	  one	  certainly	  can’t	  assume	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  categorical	  normative	  reasons	  for	  belief	  poses	  the	  same	  problems	  as	  would	  the	  existence	  of	  categorical	  normative	  reasons	  for	  action.	  	  	  The	  two	  responses	  considered	  above	  draw	  on	  deep-­‐seated	  differences	  between	  intentional	  action	  and	  belief	  (in	  terms	  of	  their	  motivational	  profiles	  and	  aims	  respectively).	  But	  a	  simpler	  argument	  may	  also	  be	  available.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  to	  evidential	  support	  relations	  proceeds	  on	  the	  model	  of	  Jackson’s	  analytical	  functionalism.18	  First	  we	  find	  the	  platitudes	  that	  surround	  the	  concept,	  then	  we	  make	  the	  relevant	  substitutions	  of	  bound	  variables.	  It	  may	  simply	  be	  that	  no	  such	  reduction	  of	  categorical	  moral	  reasons	  is	  available	  because	  the	  platitudes	  on	  our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  See	  Millar	  [2004],	  Cowie	  [2014b].	  16	  Admittedly,	  this	  would	  not	  show	  that	  categorical	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  reducible.	  It	  would	  however	  show	  that	  they	  are	  grounded	  (i.e.	  non-­‐fundamental).	  17	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  read	  some	  contemporary	  ‘constitutivists’	  in	  this	  way	  [Evans	  and	  Shah	  2012].	  18	  See	  Jenkins	  [2011]	  for	  discussion.	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moral	  concepts	  are	  insufficiently	  determinate	  to	  allow	  for	  it.	  It	  may	  be,	  that	  is,	  that	  well	  informed	  and	  conceptually	  competent	  users	  of	  a	  ‘mature’	  folk	  morality	  would	  fail	  to	  converge.	  On	  the	  assumption	  that	  convergence	  is	  itself	  a	  condition	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  moral	  facts	  and	  properties,	  a	  moral	  error	  theory	  would	  follow	  [Lillehammer	  2004].	  Jackson	  has,	  of	  course,	  expressed	  optimism	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  [Jackson	  1998:	  137].	  But	  reflection	  on	  moral	  disagreement	  poses	  at	  least	  a	  prima	  facie	  problem	  for	  this.	  And	  there	  need	  be	  no	  ‘deep’	  source	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  convergence	  here.	  A	  lack	  of	  convergence	  may	  rest	  only	  on	  contingent	  facts	  about	  the	  origin	  and	  function	  of	  our	  moral	  concepts.	  Given	  this,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  a	  Jackson-­‐style	  reduction	  of	  categorical	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  goes	  through	  (if	  (4)	  is	  true	  on	  this	  model,	  it	  does)	  but	  that	  nothing	  analogous	  is	  true	  for	  morality.19	  	  
4. The	  Master	  Argument	  	  I	  am	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  present	  the	  ‘master	  argument’	  against	  companions	  in	  guilt	  theorists.	  The	  first	  premise	  of	  the	  argument	  concerns	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy:	  	   (1) The	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  can	  be	  successfully	  established	  (in	  the	  dialectical	  context)	  only	  if	  evidential	  support	  relations	  just	  are	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  	  This	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  rejection	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy.	  Firstly,	  suppose	  that	  the	  consequent	  of	  (1)	  is	  false,	  that	  is:	  	   (2) Categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  not	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  	  It	  would	  follow	  that:	  	   (3) The	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  cannot	  be	  successfully	  established	  (in	  the	  dialectical	  context).	  	  Suppose,	  however,	  that	  that	  the	  consequent	  of	  (1)	  is	  true.	  That	  is:	  	   (4) Categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  evidential	  support	  relations.	  	  As	  I	  argued	  above,	  it	  would	  follow	  that:	  	   (5) The	  parity	  premise	  is	  false.	  	  Given	  that	  (2)	  and	  (4)	  are	  jointly	  exhaustive,	  it	  follows	  that:	  	   (6) Either	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  can’t	  established	  or	  the	  parity	  premise	  is	  false.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  This	  is,	  I	  think,	  Fletcher’s	  point	  [2009:	  366].	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  So:	  	   Conclusion:	  The	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  fails.	  	  I	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  a	  ‘master	  argument’	  as	  it	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  single	  argument	  that	  synthesizes	  the	  existing	  worries	  with	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  arguments	  in	  the	  literature.	  We	  can	  think	  of	  it	  as	  a	  dilemma.	  Either	  categorical,	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  are	  evidential	  support	  relations	  or	  they	  are	  not.	  If	  they	  are,	  then	  the	  parity	  premise	  is	  false.	  If	  they	  are	  not,	  then	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  isn’t	  established.	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  fails.	  I	  now	  demonstrate	  how	  this	  argument	  synthesises	  and	  develops	  the	  existing	  worries	  with	  companions	  in	  guilt	  arguments	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  Firstly,	  and	  as	  noted	  above,	  some	  of	  the	  existing	  worries	  with	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  in	  the	  literature	  centre	  on	  –	  or	  at	  least	  allude	  to	  –	  the	  possibility	  that	  evidential	  support	  relations	  are	  non-­‐normative.	  I	  have	  claimed	  that	  this	  possibility	  is	  in	  fact	  correct.	  In	  this	  sense,	  my	  argument	  factors	  in	  these	  existing	  concerns.	  There	  are	  problems	  with	  using	  these	  existing	  concerns	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  refutation	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  however.	  Most	  obviously,	  many	  philosophers	  will	  simply	  resist	  the	  claim	  that	  evidential	  support	  relations	  are	  non-­‐normative.	  This	  can	  easily	  lead	  to	  a	  stalemate.	  My	  argument	  is	  effective	  in	  that	  it	  provides	  a	  way	  out	  of	  that	  stalemate.	  Specifically,	  the	  argument	  (4)-­‐(5)	  demonstrates	  that	  even	  those	  who	  don’t	  accept	  (2)	  should	  still	  reject	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy.	  	  Secondly,	  some	  of	  the	  existing	  worries	  with	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  in	  the	  literature	  are	  based	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  identity	  between	  evidential	  support	  relations	  and	  categorical	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief.	  As	  cited	  above,	  Heathwood	  is	  the	  best	  example.	  My	  argument	  (in	  (4)-­‐(5))	  factors	  in	  this	  existing	  consideration.	  But	  my	  argument	  is	  not	  based	  on	  it.	  Even	  if	  it	  should	  turn	  out	  that	  no	  such	  identity	  holds	  true,	  I	  still	  claim	  that	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  fails.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  identity	  would	  entail	  (2).	  And	  this	  causes	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  to	  fail	  for	  reasons	  outlined	  above.	  	  	  Thirdly,	  some	  of	  the	  existing	  worries	  with	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  in	  the	  literature	  turn	  on	  seemingly	  disconnected	  disanalogies.	  For	  example,	  some	  philosophers	  mention	  the	  disanalogy	  between	  the	  aims	  of	  belief	  and	  action.	  Others	  discuss	  the	  worry	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  convergence	  in	  moral	  judgment	  across	  cultures.	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  provided	  a	  single	  framework	  in	  which	  to	  integrate	  these	  concerns.	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  they	  can	  all	  be	  understood	  as	  instances	  of	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  and	  the	  parity	  premise	  (i.e.	  instances	  in	  support	  of	  (5))	  that	  follow	  from	  the	  identity	  of	  evidential	  support	  relations	  with	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  belief	  (i.e.	  (4)).	  	  	  Fourthly,	  my	  argument	  picks	  up	  on	  a	  worry	  expressed	  but	  imperfectly	  developed	  in	  ‘Why	  Companions	  in	  Guilt	  Arguments	  Won’t	  Work’	  [Cowie	  2014a].	  The	  worry	  expressed	  in	  that	  article	  is	  that	  the	  two	  premises	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  are	  in	  tension.	  I	  argue	  that	  (i)	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  is	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adequately	  supported	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  epistemic	  reasons	  possess	  some	  ‘special	  property’	  (for	  example,	  the	  property	  of	  being	  such	  that	  denying	  their	  existence	  is	  self-­‐defeating),	  and	  that	  (ii)	  this	  undermines	  the	  parity	  premise.	  It	  undermines	  the	  parity	  premise	  because	  moral	  reasons	  don’t	  also	  possess	  the	  relevant	  ‘special	  property’	  (denying	  their	  existence	  isn’t	  self-­‐defeating).	  So,	  adequately	  establishing	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  undermines	  the	  parity	  premise.	  One	  obvious	  worry	  with	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  establishing	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise	  by	  appeal	  to	  the	  ‘special	  properties’	  of	  epistemic	  reasons	  undermines	  the	  parity	  premise	  in	  the	  right	  way.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  how	  companions	  in	  guilt	  theorists	  have	  responded.	  They	  have	  claimed	  that	  my	  argument	  seems	  to	  concede	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  epistemic	  existence	  premise.	  It	  thereby	  concedes	  the	  existence	  of	  categorical	  reasons.	  And	  this	  is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  to	  work.	  This	  article	  provides	  a	  response.	  Firstly,	  I	  picks	  up	  on	  the	  basic	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument:	  in	  (4)-­‐(5)	  I	  claim	  that	  if	  categorical	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  are	  evidential	  support	  relations	  then	  the	  parity	  premise	  is	  undermined.	  Secondly,	  it	  strengthens	  the	  claim	  that	  this	  undermines	  the	  parity	  premise.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  showing	  that	  if	  normative	  epistemic	  reasons	  are	  identical	  to	  evidential	  support	  relations	  then	  those	  reasons	  (unlike	  moral	  reasons)	  are	  not	  irreducibly	  normative.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  it	  is	  the	  apparent	  irreducible	  normativity	  of	  moral	  reasons	  that	  lies	  behind	  so	  much	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  and	  epistemological	  unease	  with	  them.	  So,	  I	  now	  explain	  why	  epistemic	  reasons	  may	  be	  categorical	  yet	  not	  metaphysically	  and	  epistemologically	  problematic	  in	  anything	  like	  the	  sense	  that	  moral	  reasons	  are.	  	  
5. Conclusion	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  –	  at	  least	  if	  it	  is	  understood	  as	  an	  argument	  by	  analogy	  with	  epistemic	  reasons	  -­‐	  fails.	  Showing	  otherwise	  would	  require	  either	  denying	  (1)	  or	  jointly	  establishing	  (4)	  and	  denying	  (5).	  The	  former	  strategy	  would	  render	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  argument	  dialectically	  ineffective.	  The	  latter	  would	  require	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  theorist	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  arguments	  offered	  in	  sections	  2	  and	  3.	  At	  the	  very	  least	  the	  companions	  in	  guilt	  strategy	  is	  not	  a	  shortcut	  to	  the	  denial	  of	  the	  error	  theory.	  This	  is	  good	  news	  for	  moral	  error	  theorists.20	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